Armed violence and poverty in El Salvador: a mini case study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative by Hume, Mo
  
Armed violence and poverty in El Salvador 
















Armed violence and poverty in El Salvador, Hume, November 2004 
The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative 
 
The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned the Centre 
for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) at Bradford University to carry out 
research to promote understanding of how and when poverty and vulnerability is 
exacerbated by armed violence. This study programme, which forms one element in a 
broader “Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative”, aims to provide the full documentation 
of that correlation which DFID feels is widely accepted but not confirmed. It also aims to 
analyse the processes through which such impacts occur and the circumstances which 
exacerbate or moderate them. In addition it has a practical policy-oriented purpose and 
concludes with programming and policy recommendations to donor government 
agencies. 
 
This report on El Salvador is one of 13 case studies (all of the case studies can be found 
at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics). This research draws upon secondary data sources including 
existing research studies, reports and evaluations commissioned by operational agencies, 
and early warning and survey data where this has been available. These secondary 
sources have been complemented by interviews with government officers, aid 
policymakers and practitioners, researchers and members of the local population. The 
analysis and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the views or policy of DFID or the UK government. 
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Executive summary 
 
One of the most powerful conflicts to affect Central America in the 1980s was that in El 
Salvador (1980-1992), resulting in the death of more than 80,000 citizens. The 1992 
Peace Accords are widely recognised as having put an end to the twelve-year war, but 
have been accused of failing in their mission to bring an end to pervasive violence and to 
build a new and more equal society. Although El Salvador is now characterised as a 
middle-income country, in 2001, the UN estimated that almost a half of El Salvador's 
population continue to live in precarious conditions.1 Over a decade since the formal 
cessation of its political conflict, El Salvador remains one of the most unequal societies in 
the world, ranking 0.54 on the GINI index, with over 40 per cent of its population living 
in conditions of poverty.2 Efforts to build a meaningful peace and implement 
developmental progress have been hampered by continuing high levels of armed 
violence. Within Latin America, El Salvador stands out as one of the most violent 
countries. The boundaries between the definition of ‘armed violence’ and ‘crime’ are 
somewhat nebulous in the El Salvador context, since SALW are used in much criminal 
activity. Random criminal violence and highly visible gang activity have contributed to a 
situation where fear and insecurity still characterise everyday life for many citizens. This 
has exhibited itself through a sharp rise in street crime, a growing gang culture and high 
levels of violence in private realms of existence.  
 
Research undertaken during the 1990s estimated that anywhere between 6000 and 8000 
murders occur each year in El Salvador, a country of just over 6 million inhabitants. This 
recorded average murder rate more than doubled from 1991 (43.5 per 100,000 
inhabitants) to 1994 (over 100 per 100,000 inhabitants).3 One observer has argued that 
the 1990s will have seen more violent deaths than the war years.4 Figures for other 
violent crimes are similarly high, with 25,548 violent crimes reported in 1998.5 One of 
the most notable legacies of the civil war has been the extreme militarisation of society. 
At a conservative estimate, there are some 400,000 - 450,000 arms in the hands of 
civilians. Around 35.7 per cent (14,000) of these are legally held.6 This translates into 2 
firearms for every ten adults. There are an estimated 4 million firearms in the hands of 
civilians in Central America.  
 
In addition to the massive challenges and costs of post-war reconstruction (US $1,826 
million as calculated on the signing of the Peace Accords in 1992),7 the last decade has 
seen a series of natural disasters that have further retarded the country's development. 
Together with historic structural inequalities and the weakening of social fabric, the end 
of the war left a huge inactive workforce. This was, at least in part, a result of the 
demobilisation of military groups, who received very little support for reinsertion into 
civil life, but it was exacerbated by the scarcity of sources of employment. The period of 
                                                 
1 Human Development Report (2001). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Cruz (2003: 19), citing De Mesquita (2002). 
4 Ramos (2000). 
5 Cruz et al., (1998: 4-6). 
6 Ibid: 25 
7 Dunkerley (1993). 
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post-war reconstruction coincided with the implementation of a stringent neo-liberal 
agenda and structural adjustment policies. This severely limited public services and 
reduced sources of employment. The Land Transfer Programme (PTT) stipulated by the 
peace accords was limited in its scope and only included registered combatants. Added to 
the massive circulation of arms, a historic lack of respect for the rule of law and weak 
state institutions, this combination of factors has allowed other long-standing social 
conflicts/problems to be brought to the fore and generate new spaces for armed violence.8 
Some demobilised groups have been accused of becoming involved in organised crime, 
especially ex-members of the military. The fledgling National Civil Police (PNC) that 
was formed after the signing of the Peace Accords was ill-equipped to deal with the wave 
of crime and violence. There has been a steady erosion of confidence in the security 
forces in the last decade and this is reflected in the growing privatisation of the security 
apparatus: there are currently an estimated 70,000 private security agents in operation 
whereas the PNC has an active force of approximately 20,000 officers.9
 
Post-war violence in El Salvador has exacerbated existing social cleavages. Fear and 
mistrust work together to undermine social capital in many ways and create a vicious 
circle for the reproduction of violence. The disintegration of social networks has further 
reinforced the existing fragmentation and political and socio-economic polarisation of 
society, and public spaces for collective action have been reduced. Communities' capacity 
to deal with conflict is limited and violence has become part of everyday neighbourhood 
interaction. For example, squabbles between neighbours often result in physical fights 
and weapons (knives, pistols etc) can be used. Drunken fights are aggravated by the use 
of SALW, as are traffic incidents.  Figures from the PNC, estimate that 86 per cent of 
murders are caused by "social violence", such as family disputes, fights between 
neighbours etc. According to sources from the PNC, SALW are used in around 85 per 
cent of homicides.10
 
In the last decade, one of the most dramatic developments in the pandemic of violence 
has been the emergence of youth gangs (maras). Largely made up of young men from 
low-income neighbourhoods, maras have become synonymous with terror and insecurity. 
The groups are heavily armed and use knives, home-made weapons (firearms and 
grenades) and legally and illegally held SALW in their activities. Figures estimate that 
there are anywhere between ten and thirty thousand active gang members in El 
Salvador.11 Few rehabilitation and prevention programmes exist for gang members and 
state responses to gangs have been largely repressive; for example, the Super Mano Dura 
(Super Iron Fist) legislative measures that have been implemented to combat the 
problem. 
 
Violence is not experienced by all members of society in the same way and it is often the 
poor who are more vulnerable to extreme violence. It is important to emphasise that 
poverty does not cause violence and not all poor people are violent. In situations where 
                                                 
8 Amaya Cóbar and Palmieri (2000). 
9 Melara (2001). 
10 Interview with PNC (September, 2004). 
11 El Diario de Hoy, 24 July, 2003, interview with PNC. 
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poverty and inequality overlap, armed violence is employed as an option by some people, 
with particular lethality when these conditions coincide with SALW use.  
 
In urban areas, high density and overcrowded housing, limited access to basic services 
and limited livelihood opportunities have put increased pressures on communities, with 
an accompanying explosion in violence. There are few spaces in Salvadoran society that 
are free from violence/threat and the problem of violence is also serious in rural areas. 
Urgent action is needed to address the problem of violence in a holistic manner, since 
current state programmes tend to be largely repressive and both state and non-state 
prevention programmes are limited in terms of both resources and scope. The devastating 
effect of SALW on current levels of violence should not be underestimated, contributing 
to levels of violence and also the destruction of human capital. Reforms to the current 
firearms legislation are urgent. Existing laws are lax and highly permissive. There is a 
widespread culture of SALW use in El Salvador and educational programmes targeted on 
the dangers of SALW are necessary. Some steps have been taken by the UNDP’s 
Violence in a Transitional Society Programme; however, these need to be replicated 
throughout the country.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 El Salvador and armed violence 
 
The 1992 Peace Accords in El Salvador are widely recognised as having put an end to the 
twelve-year war, but have been accused of failing in their mission to build a new and 
more equal society.12 Efforts to achieve peaceful and more democratic societies 
throughout Latin America have been undermined by existing (and, in many cases, 
deepening) social cleavages. These cleavages, which Kooning and Kruijt call "governance 
voids", provide key spaces for the propagation of violence. "In spite of the demise of 
authoritarian rule - violence is seen as a normal option with which to pursue interests, 
attain power or resolve conflicts".13 Indeed, Concha-Eastman asserts that violence "has 
recently acquired alarming proportions and dimensions in many countries".14 Within 
Latin America, El Salvador stands out as one of the most violent countries. Efforts to 
build a meaningful peace have been hampered by continuing high levels of armed 
violence. The boundaries between the definition of ‘armed violence’ and ‘crime’ more 
broadly are somewhat nebulous since small arms and light weapons (SALW), and other 
weapons, are used in much criminal activity. As such, the discussion below refers to both 
armed violence and crime.   
 
Existing conceptual frameworks seek to locate contemporary violence in either a post-
conflict analysis or within the study of new forms of violence and criminality. The reality 
is, of course, much more complex. Current levels of violence have indeed developed and 
new forces have emerged which differ from historic politically motivated violence. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible within a study of armed violence and poverty to consider 
only the overt  ‘expressions’ of violence in isolation of the structural conditions that 
underlie its prevalence.. These structural inequalities, together with political 
authoritarianism paved the way for civil war in El Salvador and continue to shape the 
contemporary pandemic. Feldman stresses that violence is formative - it affects not only 
the development of individual and collective identity, but also how individuals interact 
with their social and physical environment.15 Further, Holden argues that the presence and 
persistence of state-sponsored violence has had a "pivotal role" in shaping society in 
Central America.16 Violence has worked through local networks, co-opting individuals 
and communities to blur the "distinction between violence carried out by public officials 
and that by civilians.17  
 
In El Salvador, terror and violence have both characterised relations between the state and 
society and shaped the formation and reproduction of society itself. The implication of 
this history of violence - or violent history - is far reaching and its legacy can be seen in 
contemporary El Salvador relations, where violence remains a powerful and debilitating 
                                                 
12 ECA (1999); Pearce (1998); Cruz (1997). 
13 Koonings and Kruijt (1999: 11). 
14 Concha-Eastman (2001: 37). 
15 Feldman (1991). 
16 Holden (1996: 437). 
17 Ibid: 444. 
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force in everyday life for many. This piece argues that continuing deep levels of social 
and economic exclusion, political authoritarianism and acute inequalities continue to 
shape  Salvadoran society. Some authors have argued that current forms of violence are 
also political, since they result from political choices, such as policies that have 
exacerbated inequalities and the continued failure of governments to address structural 
problems.18 In the context of El Salvador, where the process of peace building has 
coincided with the implementation of strict structural adjustment policies, questions must 
therefore be asked about the nature and reality of peace and the democratisation process in 
the country.  
 
Continued impunity and violence have contributed to the erosion of democratic 
expectations, undermining confidence in a fledgling democratic political system such as 
that found in El Salvador and other Latin American polities.19 The continued 
pervasiveness of violence in the region, therefore, has been linked with weak notions of 
citizenship.20 Such notions cast doubt on the viability of the democratic project; to such a 
degree that Rotker claims that current levels of violence attest to an "undeclared civil war 
in major Latin American cities",21 resonating with the ECA (Estudios CentroAmericanos) 
editorial's assessment of El Salvador's current violence as an "informal war".22 Both 
Rotker and the ECA editorial pose that current levels of violence are rooted in protest, 
albeit random and unorganised, against pervasive structural inequalities. ECA suggests 
that "El Salvador, as it stands, is not viable without radical structural change", claiming 
that transition has not addressed the roots of the conflict.23 Rotker argues:  
This undeclared civil war clearly engages elements of fear and rage, 
but it is no longer a question of planting bombs or hiding in the 
mountains to take up arms against a dictator or corrupt government. 
It deals instead with a violence that resists a whole system, creating 
it in a more profound way, at the heart of its social relations. As it 
makes victims of us all, this undeclared civil war obliterates spaces 
of difference and differentiation, making all of us experience 
injustice, insecurity and inequality.24
 
1.2 The historical context 
 
During the 1980s, Central America was afflicted by a succession of brutal civil wars. One 
of the most powerful of these conflicts was in El Salvador, which claimed more than 
80,000 lives, in addition to the forced displacement of more than one million men, women 
and children in the region.25 In January 1992, the internationally brokered Chapultepec 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Tedesco (2000) on Argentina, and Pinheiro (1996) on Brazil. 
19 In El Salvador, for example, those individuals responsible for the massive human rights abuses during the war have 
still not been tried due to an amnesty declared by the government prior to the publication of the report of the Truth 
Commission. See: Popkin (1999), Kaye (1999) and Méndez (1999). 
20 Moser and Winton, 2001; Kooning and Kruijt, 1999; Méndez, 1999; Vilas, 1996. 
21 Rotker (2001: 18). 
22 ECA (1999: 967). 
23 Ibid: 969. 
24 Rotker (2001: 18)  is speaking of Latin America in general; however, her analysis appears particularly pertinent to 
the Salvadoran situation.  
25 Ardón (1998). 
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Peace Accord was signed between the government and the left wing FMLN, putting an 
end to the twelve year civil war. The Peace Accord brought with it the hope of prosperity 
and political transformation and while the last twelve years have seen many positive 
developments in the country, the reality of peace in El Salvador remains contested. The 
everyday lives of much of Central America's population remain characterised by 
exclusion, poverty and violence.26
 
Random criminal violence and highly visible gang activity have contributed to a situation 
where fear and insecurity still characterise everyday life for many citizens. This exhibits 
itself through a sharp rise in street crime, a growing gang culture and high levels of 
violence in private realms of existence. Research undertaken during the 1990s estimated 
that anywhere between 6000 and 8000 murders occur each year in El Salvador, a country 
of just over 6 million inhabitants. This recorded average murder rate more than doubled 
from 1991 (43.5 per 100,000 inhabitants) to 1994 (over 100 per 100,000 inhabitants).27 
One observer has argued that the 1990s will have seen more violent deaths than the war 
years.28 Figures for violent crimes are similarly high, with 25,548 violent crimes reported 
in 1998 alone.29  
 
In recent years, there has been an increased interest, both from the academic community 
and policy makers, to understand the development of the violence pandemic in Latin 
America. According to recent research by the World Bank, the Latin American and 
Caribbean region is one of the most violent in the world, following only Africa which, 
based on criminal victimisation rates, is considered the most violent continent.30 Regional 
figures from Latin America in 1990 demonstrate a murder rate of 22.9 per 100,000, 
which is over twice that of a world average of 10.7 per 100,000 inhabitants (see Table 1.1 
for murder rates from Latin America).31 Central America and El Salvador, in particular, 
stand out as particularly violent. Efforts to understand violence have identified the 
continuing social and political cleavages in the country as determining factors. Key 
themes for analysis have been: citizen security,32 crime,33 gangs and youth violence,34 
state weakness 35 and social exclusion.36 Two major studies on the availability and use of 
firearms have been published in recent years.37  
                                                 
26 Pearce (1998). 
27 Cruz (2003: 19), citing De Mesquita (2002). These levels are very high: on a global scale more than 10 murders per 
100,000 inhabitants is judged as extremely violent (Ramos, 2000: 9). Although these figures have since been 
questioned due to problems in the gathering of official statistics, El Salvador is still regarded as one of the most violent 
countries in the world (Cruz, 2003). 
28 Ramos (2000). 
29 Cruz et al. (1998: 4-6). 
30 McIlwaine (1999). 
31 Ibid: 2, citing Murray and López (1996). 
32 IUDOP/FUNDAUNGO (2003). 
33 Cruz et al. (1999). 
34 See, for example, Smutt and Miranda (1999); Homies Unidos and IUDOP (1998); Ramos et al. (1998). 
35 See, for example, Crustin (2001); Amaya Cóbar and Palmieri (2000). 
36 See, for example, Savenije and Andrade Eekhoff (2003); Ramos (2000). 
37 UNDP (2003) and Cruz and Beltran (2000). 
 7
Armed violence and poverty in El Salvador, Hume, November 2004 
Table 1.1: Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean (per 100,000 
population)38  
 





Guatemala - 150 75.3 
El Salvador - 15039 41.3 
Colombia 20.5 89.5 89.5 
Jamaica - 35 - 
Brazil 11.5 19.7 - 
Nicaragua - 18.3 18.3 
Mexico 18.2 17.8 17.8 
Venezuela 11.7 15.2 16.0 
Trinidad and Tobago 2.1 12.6 - 
Dominican Republic - 11.9 - 
Peru 2.4 11.5 11.5 
Panama 2.1 10.9 10.9 
Ecuador 6.4 10.3 15.3 
United States 10.7 10.1 - 
Honduras - 9.4 45.0 
Argentina 3.9 4.8 - 
Costa Rica 5.7 5.6 5.6 
Uruguay 2.6 4.4 4.4 
Paraguay 5.1 4.0 4.0 
Chile 2.6 3.0 - 
 
 
2. The context of armed violence 
2.1 The underlying conflict dynamics 
 
State brutality was a fact of everyday life for Salvadoran citizens for decades. Violence 
worked between and within social networks, employing members of articulated 
intelligence structures – the Democratic Nationalist Organisation (ORDEN) - within 
communities to spy on their neighbours.40 The intensity of military brutality together with 
acute social and economic inequalities and the impossibility of democratic struggle 
ultimately proved decisive factors in the decision of the left wing political movement - 
Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN) - to resort to violence.41 
Beginning in 1980, the war continued throughout the decade until a military stalemate 
was reached at the end of the decade. Both sides were spent and social and international 
pressure to end the war was immense. On a global level, the end of the decade also 
                                                 
38 PAHO (1997), cited by World Bank (1997); figures from 1990s taken from Cruz (2003: 17). 
39 El Salvador was still at war when these figures were recorded. 
40 At the local level ORDEN served as a unit for intelligence gathering and repression.  The organisation provided an 
effective source of military intelligence with as many as 300,000 members (Holden, 1996). 
41 There were repeated election frauds throughout the years of military rule, effectively denying the opposition any 
democratic voice. Furthermore, any sign of dissent was brutally quashed.   
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coincided with the last days of the cold war, lessening the geopolitical significance of the 
conflict.42 The end of the cold war had effectively removed much needed external 
assistance from both sides. The role of the US in the war had been immense and the 
millions of dollars provided in military aid undoubtedly prolonged the conflict.  
 
Government figures published on the eve of the final truce in El Salvador estimated the 
direct damage of the war at US$329 million and indirect damage at US $708 million. 
They calculated the cost of reconstruction needs at US $1,826 million.43 In addition, the 
last decade has seen a series of natural disasters that have had adverse effects on the 
country's development. The widespread devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch in 1998 
and, more intensely, the earthquakes of January and February 2001, effectively cancelled-
out infrastructure and economic reconstruction since the end of the war. Figures indicate 
that 271,653 houses were damaged in the earthquakes, 163,866 of which were left 
inhabitable. It was the poor who felt the extent of these disasters most acutely and the 
situation brought to the fore existing problems in housing and deprivation. In 2001, the 
UN estimated that almost a half of El Salvador's population continue to live in precarious 
conditions.44  
 
Over a decade since the formal cessation of its political conflict, El Salvador remains one 
of the most unequal societies in the world, ranking 0.54 on the GINI index, and over 40 
per cent of its population live in poverty.45 Politically, society remains extremely 
polarised with both the left and right being regarded as the most extreme in the region.46 
Though UN sources estimate that the proportion of the Salvadoran population living in 
poverty fell from 65.7 per cent in 1991 to 47.5 per cent in 1999, there still exists a huge 
gap between rural and urban living standards. In 1999 the average rural income 
represented only 40 per cent of the average urban income. Furthermore, figures from 
1998 indicate that the poorest 10 per cent of the population have only a 1.2 per cent share 
of the country's income or consumption. This contrasts with the top 10 per cent who have 
39.4 per cent. As such, El Salvador remains one of the most unequal countries in Latin 
America. It is this context, characterised by inequality and vulnerability, which forms the 
backdrop of current patterns of violence in El Salvador.47
 
2.1.1 Post-war armed violence 
 
El Salvador is arguably a post-conflict state since the formal cessation of political armed 
conflict took place in January 1992 (i.e. over twelve years ago). However, the accords 
negotiated between the right-wing government and the left wing guerrilla movement, 
FMLN, failed to encompass any real measures aimed at socio-economic reform. 
Furthermore, a general amnesty was declared prior to the publication of the report of the 
Truth Commission, which effectively safeguarded both sides from facing justice. Instead, 
                                                 
42 Murray with Barry (1995). 
43 Dunkerley (1993: 12). 
44 Human Development Report 2001 (2001). 
45 See Human Development Report 2001 (2001).The GINI index is used to measure inequality based on per capita 
income. The global average is 0.4 and the average for Latin American is 0.47 (www.undp.org). 
46 Cruz (2003a). 
47 Ibid. 
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the talks resulted in a settlement which aimed and indeed succeeded in opening new 
spaces for participation in political life. Spaces for political participation have emerged, 
allowing the FMLN to emerge as a major political party. Civil society has also been 
strengthened with the emergence of new forces, such as the women's movement, 
environmental organisations and health workers unions. In terms of violence, two key 
positive developments are:  
 
- State sponsored brutality, which had been central to everyday life since 1932 and 
particularly acute in the late 1970s and throughout the war (1980 - 1992), has 
diminished dramatically.48  
 
- The military has been downsized considerably and the old security apparatus, 
responsible for 95 per cent of the serious human rights violations that occurred 
between 1980 and 1992 has been transformed to make way for the new National Civil 
Police (PNC).49 However, one of the major problems facing the new police force is its 
weak capacity to address the high levels of armed criminality and violence in the 
post-war period.  
 
Together with historic structural inequalities and the weakening of social fabric, the end 
of the war left a huge inactive workforce. This was, at least in part, a result of the 
demobilisation of military groups, who received very little support for reinsertion into 
civil life, but it was exacerbated by the scarcity of sources of employment. Added to the 
massive circulation of arms and a historic lack of respect for the rule of law, this 
combination of factors has allowed other long-standing social conflicts/problems to be 
brought the fore and generate new spaces of armed violence.50 Some demobilised groups 
have been accused of becoming involved in organised crime, especially  ex-army 
personnel. They have both the skills acquired during armed conflict and the access to 
weaponry. In some cases these groups are comprised of individuals who had previously 
belonged to opposing factions within the military.51 It would be simplistic to suggest that 
all of those who are now involved in criminality participated directly in the war or, 
indeed, that those who did participate in the war are more likely to be involved in 
criminal activities. However, a study of the prison system found that three of every ten 
prisoners played an active role on one side or the other during the war. This is relatively 
                                                 
48 In 1932 30,000 peasants were killed by government forces following a tentative uprising in what is known as La 
Matanza (the massacre). This event paved the way for a series of military dictatorships which lasted until the outbreak 
of war in 1980. The military acted as agents of repression for the economic élite and, in return, the military controlled 
the machinery of the state (Mason. 1999). 
49 Aguilar et al. (2001), citing Truth Commission, (1993). 
50 It must be emphasised that given the high levels of brutality exercised by the state security apparatus and the 
corruption of judicial bodies in the pre-war era, it is hardly surprising that citizens feel that they have little access to 
justice. See Aguilar et al. (2001), Amaya Cóbar and Palmieri (2000) and Popkin (1999).  
51 One 29 year old man serving a murder sentence makes a direct link between his participation in the war and his 
involvement in crime: "And then he said that you know I can't just lend you that gun, but I can also lend you any of 
these ones, whatever you want. You see he had been a sub-sergeant and was on sick leave [from the military]. I had 
been on sick leave too.  In those days I had had gone to study in the army, even though my brother was in the guerrilla, 
that's how it was… I made friends with him [the sergeant] and, well, I think that he liked me because sometimes you 
just get on with people and he began to trust me. He told me that he could lend me guns to carry out crimes, that he 
could lend me the guns that I wanted. He had rifles, machine guns, pistols, revolvers and we went about together. He's 
dead now" (Hume, 2003: 108). Hence his participation in the war not only equipped him with skills that he could later 
use for criminal activity, but also supplied him with a network of contacts to secure his access to an arsenal of weapons. 
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high given that the proportion of the population that participated in the war "did not 
exceed 6 per cent in conditions of combat.52 The study points out that the prisoners with a 
history of participation in the war are those who tend to be more involved in crimes of a 
more violent character, with the exception of kidnapping.53  
 
It is important to note that the visibility of certain crimes affects social reaction and the 
ensuing social panic. Kidnapping, for example, has been considered a serious problem in 
recent years though it affects only a very small number of (powerful) people. Indeed, it 
has decreased significantly in 2004 with no recorded cases in the period January - 
August.54 The visibility of this type of crime is key to ensuring policy provision and there 
has been a serious investment of resources to combat kidnapping with the formation of 
specialist divisions in both the PNC and FGR. Other common violent crimes involving 
firearms include: rape, armed robbery and extortion. See Table 2.1. 
 





Injury Rape Kidnapping Extortion Robbery Mugging 
2003 1517 3461 740 8 197 3337 7505 
2004 1796 2855 568 0 216 3363 6972 
Source: PNC  
 
In addition, there is a growing drug problem in El Salvador, both of trafficking and 
consumption. El Salvador is on the transport route from Colombia to the US and the use 
of crack cocaine has risen significantly in recent years. An estimated 10.5 million tonnes 
of illegal drugs pass through Central America every year.56 The drug trade has very 
strong links with organised crime, and, latterly, youth gangs have been accused of heavy 
involvement in selling and consumption. There are a number of well articulated 
transnational crime groups which move within Central America, responsible for 
widespread car theft and illegal arms trafficking.    
 
2.1.2 The emergence of youth gangs – ‘maras’  
 
In the last decade, one of the most dramatic developments in the pandemic of violence 
has been the emergence of youth gangs. Largely made up of young men from low-
income neighbourhoods, maras have become synonymous with terror and insecurity. The 
groups are heavily armed and use knives, home-made weapons (firearms and grenades) 
and legally and illegally held SALW in their activities. According to Ramos, membership 
of maras outnumbers that of the guerrilla forces during the war twofold.57 Figures 
estimate that there are anywhere between ten and thirty thousand active gang members in 
                                                 
52 Cruz et al, (2000: 71). 
53 Ibid: (71-72) 
54 Interview with Attorney General's Office (September 2004). 
55 PNC data; table compiled by author.  
56 UNDP (2003). 
57 Ramos (1998). 
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El Salvador.58 There are two main gangs in operation, both with transnational links 
throughout Central America, Mexico and the US: Mara Salvatrucha and Mara 18. There 
are also smaller gangs such as the Mao Mao and AC/DC. In recent years there have also 
been a proliferation of student gangs in the capital. Although markedly different from 
maras, these students are organised and create disturbances, fighting against groups from 
rival schools. Generally, they use belts and stones; however, there have been documented 
incidences where they use home made grenades.59 In an interview with a female member 
of the 18 streetgang, she (referring to gangmember) highlighted that the relatively easy 
access to SALW in El Salvador has meant that Salvadoran gangs are better armed and 
more deadly than their US counterparts and it is not unusual for gangs to possess heavy 
weaponry.60  
 
In El Salvador, the government response to youth gangs has been repressive.61 A new 
anti-gang law - Mano Dura (Heavy Hand) - was introduced in July 2003. It was met with 
mixed reactions and regarded as a populist gesture in the run up to the presidential 
election (March 2004). Much of the law was unconstitutional and violated international 
human rights agreements (such as the Convention for the Rights of the Child - CRC) thus 
many judges refused to implement it. Due to these problems, it was renegotiated in 2004 
and new legal reforms under the heading "Super Mano Dura" are currently being 
implemented. Representatives from different sectors of the state and civil society came 
together to discuss the reforms. According to one participant, the exercise was a success 
in political terms in that the state was seen to consult with different state bodies and 
representatives of civil society, though very little attention has subsequently been paid to 
the prevention and rehabilitation elements that were suggested in the process.62Few 
rehabilitation and prevention programmes exist for gang members.63 Homies Unidos, an 
NGO working with active gang members, has recently had to close because of lack of 
funding which has dried up since September 2000. Indeed, one of its workers left the 
country due to threats following the introduction of the Mano Dura law. He is now in jail 
in the US for illegal entry. Others are keeping a low profile.64 In August 2004, there was 
a massacre in Mariona prison where 31 inmates were killed after a row broke out 
between members of the 18 gang and 'civilian' inmates. Over 30 more were seriously 
injured. On 23 September, gang members in the Chalatenango and Cojutepeque prisons 
staged a protest against the authorities. The members of the 18 gang were articulating 
their fears of the new reforms and demanded that the 50 prisoners who had been 
                                                 
58 El Diario de Hoy (24 July, 2003); interview with PNC (September 2004). 
59 Interview with Wim Savenije (September 2004). 
60 However, it is important to emphasise that most gangmembers do not have access to such weapons and the most 
widely used weapon within gangs continues to be the knife (interview with 18 gang (September 2004). 
61 For example, in the mid-1990s, a group formed to kill gang members in San Miguel was seen as a "necessary evil" 
by the then governor of that department (province) (Ramos, 1998: 207). Recent incidences of decapitated corpses found 
in San Salvador have been likened to tactics used by the death squads in the late 1970s and 1980s. The authorities have 
attributed these murders to gangs and used them as a justification for the implementation of a new anti-gang law. 
However, rumours circulate about the involvement of the PNC in the murders given the similarity to death squad type 
murders.  
62 Interview with PNC (September, 2004). 
63 No state programme exists to date, though there are various church initiatives, such as the Don Bosco University 
rehabilitation programme.  
64 Anti gang laws have also been implemented in other countries in the region; for example, Plan Escoba (Brush Plan) 
in Guatemala.  
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transferred to a high security prison be returned to the mainstream system since they 
feared for their safety. Territorial Anti-gang groups (GTA) have been formed on a 
national level that are made up of military and National Civil Police (PNC). These groups 
began to operate in August/September 2004 and it is, therefore, too premature to assess 
their impact. However, since Mano Dura/Super Mano Dura have been in place, the 
number of murders has increased.65  
 
2.1.3 The role of the state  
 
Although there have been notable improvements in the quality of information generated 
and recorded by state bodies in recent years, there is still a dearth of unified and accurate 
data for certain types of violence. The quality of information is often dependent on the 
type of violence under scrutiny, due to chronic problems of underreporting and 
misclassification. The underreporting of crime and violence still remains a problem 
although in an interview with the Attorney General's Office, the fiscal stated that this was 
improving. Different state records can present contradictory views of the scale of 
violence and that certain areas (namely San Salvador) and certain crimes are better 
recorded than others. For example, figures from the Attorney General’s Office (FGR) 
were more reliable for murder figures until 1998 and since then, the quality of PNC 
records are regarded as having improved considerably.66
 
Depending on the source, murder rates in El Salvador can oscillate anywhere between 
150 per 100,000 in the late 1980s/early 1990s (See Table 1.1) to 57 per 100,000 
inhabitants in 2001, according to the FGR records (See Figure 2.1). On average, Cruz et 
al. maintain that the number of deaths from intentional homicides per year on a national 
level stayed over and above six thousand in the 1990s, with the highest rates being noted 
in the Western area of the country and the capital, San Salvador.67 When disaggregated 
by age and gender, these figures are particularly high for young men between15-34. The 
average homicide rate for this group is greater than two hundred deaths per 100 000 
inhabitants, while for women in the same age cohort, it is not greater than twenty.68 The 
prevalence of SALW has invariably contributed to the scale of fatal injuries.  
 
                                                 
65 Interview with PNC (September 2004). 
66 Interview with Miguel Cruz, IUDOP (September 2004). 
67 Cruz et al. (2000). 
68 Ibid: 20. 
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In recent years, the homicide level has fallen to an average of over 2000 per year on a 
national level (see Table 2.2). These data highlight that the problem of armed violence 
affects both urban and rural areas, with a concentration of murders in San Salvador and 
the predominantly rural western region. Recent figures demonstrate that the Western city 
of Sonsonate has overtaken San Salvador in homicides in 2004 70 Media reports blame 
much of this violence on gangs; however, interviews with serving police officers estimate 
that gang violence does not account for any more than 30 per cent. 
 









620 567 586 616 
Central 443 405 347 445 
 









































                                                 
69 Source: http://www.violenciaelsalvador.org.sv/indicadores/indicadoresd1.htm, citing registers from DIGESTYC, 
FGR, IML and PNC Accessed: 4 September 2003. 
70 Interview with PNC (September 2004). 
71 Police registers. 
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2.1.4 The National Civil Police (PNC)  
 
One of the recommendations of the Peace Accords was the creation of a new National 
Civilan Police Force (PNC) to replace the old National Police, National Guard and 
Treasury Police. It was made up along the following lines: 20 per cent of posts reserved 
for ex- FMLN combatants, 20 per cent for members of the old security forces and 60 per 
cent civilians. The numbers of security agents were reduced drastically from 75,000 
(including the army, the guerrillas, civil defence and the old police forces) to 6000.72 
Initially this severely reduced new force enjoyed the support of the population, but has 
been detrimentally affected by a series of high profile cases, implicating agents in 
criminal activities in addition to a weak capacity for dealing with the high levels of crime 
and violence. Figures indicate that in 1996 and 1997 respectively, only 6.11 per cent and 
8.17 per cent of murder cases were brought to trial.73 This loss of public confidence is 
also reflected in the growing privatisation of the security apparatus: there are currently an 
estimated 70,000 private security agents in operation whereas the PNC has an active 
force of approximately 20,000 officers.74 Links have been identified between private 
security agents and petty criminals who are combining to take advantage of lax arms 
control to distribute SALW illegally.75
 
To date, there has been little articulate and cohesive state response to violence and 
criminality. State policies have been largely coercive - more police, longer sentences, less 
impunity, the stigmatisation of young people and the use of youth gangs as scapegoats. 
Some preventative initiatives have been facilitated by the National Public Security 
Council (CNSP) which works with communities in Greater San Salvador to encourage 
social organisation, recuperation of abandoned public spaces, promoting sport in 
communities, as well as cultural and educational activities. These initiatives are, 
however, largely restricted to Greater San Salvador, with limited work in Sonsonate. The 
PNC has tried to strengthen relations with communities with their community policing 
initiative - PIPCOM - however its impact is unknown, with officers blaming lack of 
resources.76 Representatives from communities in Soyapango where the initiative was on 
trial had no knowledge of the PIPCOM and noted no improvement in their relations with 
the PNC.  
 
Such initiatives remain isolated and the state response to violence in the country is still 
somewhat fragmented with little co-ordination beyond the state bodies whose specific 
remit is security, i.e.: PNC, CNSP and judiciary. There is very little explicit co-ordination 
with other bodies, such as the Ministry of Education (MINED), the Women's 
Development Institute (ISDEMU) or the Salvadoran Institute for the Protection of Minors 
(ISPM, now National Salvadoran Institute for Adolescence - ISNA). Instead, policies 
tend to be primarily repressive and superficial, based on combating existing expressions 
of crime and violence. Moreover, as mentioned above, the military has recently been 
                                                 
72 See Stanley (1996). 
73 Amaya Cóbar and Palmieri (2000). 
74 Melara (2001). 
75 Godnick (2002). 
76 Interview with PNC. 
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employed to help the PNC implement the new anti-gang initiative. The presence of the 
military on the streets directly contradicts the aims of the Peace Accords.   
2.2  The significance of small arms and light weapons 
 
Although no registers are available for the pre-war years, there are numerous references 
to SALW in historical texts.77 Historical data are scarce for rates of violence and 
criminality in the region. Cruz and Beltrán, however, cite Pan American Health 
Organisation (PAHO) figures from the 1960s and 1970s, which indicate that El Salvador 
had a murder rate of around or greater than 30 per 100,000 inhabitants, compared to 
Colombia and Nicaragua's 22 and 25 per 100,000 inhabitants respectively.78 Such figures 
are demonstrative of a historical problem of endemic violence in the country, as they are 
not only over and above contemporary world averages, but well over what is judged as 
extremely violent: more than 10 murders per 100,000 inhabitants. According to the 
authors: 
The truth is, that according to evidence gathered about the period 
before the war, Salvadorans already had a serious problem of 
violence. In this sense, the problem is not new and was not created by 
the war. However, the war did contribute greatly to the 
institutionalisation of violence in the system of values and norms that 
regulate social behaviour in a tacit way as a part of personal 
interaction. When violence ceased to have a meaning in the socio-
political order, the space for it was reinforced in interpersonal 
relations.79   
 
One of the most notable legacies of the civil war has been the extreme militarisation of 
society. Although the Peace Accords included a project to disarm ex-combatants, lax 
laws and a high level of illegal firearms in circulation (dating from the war but also 
coming into the country in recent years) mean that, at a conservative estimate, there are 
some 400,000– 
450,000 arms in hands of civilians. Around 35.7 per cent (143,000) of these are legally 
held.80 This translates into 2 firearms for every ten adults. There are an estimated 4 
million firearms in the hands of civilians in Central America.  
 
Weak institutions, lax gun laws and a high social demand for SALW have invariably 
affected the lethality of violence in El Salvador. Figures indicate that crimes in which 
SALW are used tend to be more violent and result in injury or death. Many children have 
been seriously injured or killed as a result of stray bullets, yet the weak statistical register 
of violence means that this number is hard to quantify.81 Up to 1998, almost 300 PNC 
agents were killed in the line of duty.82 According to existing registers, firearms are used 
                                                 
77 UNDP (2003: 125). 
78Cruz and Beltran (2000:9). 
79 Ibid: 40. 
80 Ibid: 25. 
81 Ibid: 163. 
82 Ibid: 48. 
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in about two thirds of murders83 (see Figure 2.1), although more recent estimates of the 
use of SALW in murders put this figure at about 85 per cent.84 SALW are used in an 
estimated 70 per cent of robberies.85  
 
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) holds the SALW registers, whereas the PNC must 
enforce the law. There have been criticisms of this system, since the PNC have had 
difficulties in accessing MoD information.86 Furthermore, existing gun control legislation 
contains no stipulation about the number of SALW an individual may possess, so, in 
theory, a citizen can possess as many SALW as he/she wishes. In terms of munitions, 
individuals are allowed to import 5 lbs of gunpowder, 500 cases, 500 bullets once a year. 
In addition, they can import 200 rounds of ammunition, pepper spray, rubber bullets and 
a bullet proof vest twice a year.87
 
There are no legal sources of production of SALW in El Salvador so the legal market 
relies entirely on importation. To date, no tax has been levied on SALW imports, 
although recent fiscal changes aim to add VAT.88 In addition, there is widespread 
smuggling especially in the East of the country, where there are many places without 
border control. According to the Criminal Investigation Unit (DIC) of the PNC, the 
numbers of home-made weapons have increased in recent years.89 Youth gangs, in 
particular, use home-made weaponry which are highly dangerous for both the perpetrator 
of violence and the intended victim. 
 
A series of amnesty laws in recent years have allowed individuals to register arms legally 
without presenting proof of purchase, allowing many illegal arms to become legal (see 
Table 4.1). Campaigns for stricter gun laws have been largely unsuccessful. This is in 
part due to the lack of support from opposition groups and civil society (interview with 
Miguel Cruz, IUDOP). In addition, the current vice-minister for Public Security and ex 
director of the PNC, Rodrigo Avila, is also the owner of several gun shops and private 
security firms, highlighting a conflict of interests. Nevertheless, the UNDP Violence in a 
Transitional Society Programme together with state and non-state actors is currently 
drawing up proposals for reforms to the law. They hope to present this for debate before 
the end of next year.90  
 
                                                 
83 Ibid: 7. 
84 Interviews with PNC and UNDP. 
85 UNDP (2003). 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid: 42. 
88 Interview UNDP (September, 2004). 
89 UNDP (2003). 
90 Interview with UNDP (September, 2004). 
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(fuego: firearm; blanca: knife; otros: others) 
 
The widespread circulation of arms has increased the lethality of violence. It has also 
affected citizens’ perceptions of security and SALW are widely perceived as necessary 
for personal protection. A recent survey conducted in the country demonstrates that 81.6 
per cent of citizens feel insecure in the centre of their city or village.92 The social panic 
surrounding current levels of criminality in El Salvador creates a situation where many 
condone, if not openly advocate, the use of violence by the state and the restriction of 
democratic practices. Cruz cites figures that demonstrate that 55 per cent of Salvadorans 
would support a coup d'état in the face of the perceived anarchy of widespread 
criminality.93 Violence and criminality are repeatedly cited as major preoccupations for 
citizens alongside economic insecurity in a series of opinion polls carried out by the 
Central American University's Polling Institute (IUDOP).   
 
3. Social and cultural aspects of armed violence 
3.1 Cultural aspects 
 
Given the numbers of SALW in circulation, there exists an obvious social demand to be 
armed against the threat of violence and crime. SALW are widely perceived and defined 
as "instruments for security" and not as instruments of aggression. Citizens, therefore, 
argue that they have the right to be armed94: in a UNDP survey, 92 per cent of 
respondents who possessed SALW said that it was for protection of themselves and their 
family.95 As one resident in a marginal community in the municipality of Soyapango, 
Greater San Salvador, testifies: "For self-defence… for the protection of my family 
because everyone knows that, not with bad intentions… and not because of machismo, 
nor anything like that, for protection, you protect yourself because the authorities do 
                                                 
91 PNC register. 
92 IUDOP/FUNDAUNGO (2003:18). 
93 Cruz (2003a: 62). 
94 Cruz and Beltrán (2000: 5). 
95 UNDP (2003: 133). 
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not".96 His justification for carrying a gun is not only linked to the widespread fear or 
criminal victimisation, but also to the opinion that the authorities will not offer citizens 
the necessary protection.  
 
According to the IUDOP/ACTIVA study97, 55.4 per cent of respondents did not wish to 
possess a firearm; 6.3 per cent had one and 38.2 per cent would like to have one. This 
highlights that close to half of the population either possess or wish to possess a SALW. 
The study also found that 42.2 per cent of rural respondents in comparison to 35.4 per 
cent of urban respondents expressed the desire to own a firearm. In terms of income, 
more poorer respondents expressed the desire to have a SALW; however, this was also 
the section of the population that had least capacity to buy one. More men than women 
expressed the wish to possess SALW or have access to one, particularly young men 
between 18-25 years old. Among this cohort, 55 per cent of respondents either already 
have access to or wish to have a firearm. This group is most vulnerable to armed 
violence, registering the highest victimisation rate in terms of homicides. It is also the 
group most likely to participate in armed violence.98 Table 3.2 highlights some of the 
dominant reactions to firearms among the IUDOP/ACTIVA survey group.  
 
The widespread use of SALW reflects attitudes that privilege violence in other aspects of 
social interaction. For example, Table 3.3 highlights that 10.3 per cent would approve of 
an individual killing a rival in the case of infidelity. 55 per cent approve of killing 
criminals who terrorise communities. Indeed, there have been reported cases of lynching 
in El Salvador, although these episodes remain isolated and do not reach Guatemalan 
levels where lynching has become a serious problem.99 Twenty one per cent of 
respondents sustain that they would approve of killing 'undesirables'. In other cities where 
the same survey was carried out, approbation of such social cleansing practices was 
significantly lower. In Madrid, for example, 3.7 per cent approved, in Rio de Janeiro - 7.3 
per cent and Santiago de Chile, - 6.1 per cent.100
 
                                                 
96 Hume (2003: 73-4). 
97 IUDOP/ACTIVA (1998). 
98 UNDP (2003: 131-3). 
99 Moser and Winton (2002). 
100 UNDP (2003: 138). 
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There is a certain respect for heavy handed policies in El Salvador, with order considered 
more important than civil liberties and human rights in the face of high levels of 
criminality.102 Some 75 per cent of citizens believe that "human rights favour criminals 
and therefore you cannot deal with them [criminals]".103  Violence in this situation has 
become both something to fear and a tool with which to address latent social problems, 
nourishing a situation of widespread and ingrained paranoia, or ‘hypervigilance’.104 The 
growing prevalence of gated communities and private security guards are testament to 
citizens’ fears. Fear and the perception of chaos have been used as legitimising elements 
for increased repression and authoritarian measures. "Violence itself is ignored, justified 
and, sometimes, stimulated by those who see themselves as upstanding and exemplary 
citizens against those they consider the scum of society".105 The conceptulisation of 
SALW as instruments of security is key to this process.   
 
 
                                                 
101 National survey on attitudes, norms and values concerning violence and the use of firearms, cited in UNDP (2003: 
138). 
102 Cruz (2000: 518). 
103 IUDOP/ACTIVA (1998). 
104 UNDP (2003). 
105 Cruz and Beltrán (2000: 5). 
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Table 3.3: Responses to criminality and violence106
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3.2 Gender identity and armed violence 
 
The practice of hegemonic masculinity was reinforced during the period of conflict.107 In 
interviews, ex-combatants spoke at length about the brutalising experience of the 
military. For example, one former soldier testifies:  
They taught us that where we found him [the enemy], we had to eliminate 
him completely. We had to kill him. They made us develop a temper. I don’t 
know how to say it, terrible, a steely resolve. If I was looking at you I was 
cursing you. You couldn't keep looking at me in the eye because I would 
easily dominate you. Those are the instructions that they give you. The 
training is really hard. You cry there. Men cry during the training because to 
make men fighters, they need a heavy hand, right, someone that won’t feel 
pity because if you have a soft heart you are not a good soldier. That's what 
they teach you in the first months. Then when you get out and you meet 
civilians, they see you differently: your face, your character. Everything has 
changed. They completely transform you from the man before.108
 
                                                 
106 Source: National survey on attitudes, norms and values concerning violence and the use of firearms, cited in UNDP 
(2003: 142). 
107 Hegemonic masculinity, a term developed by Connell (1987) refers to dominant notions of masculinity that 
privilege the use of violence by men as an expression of dominance and power.  
 
108 Hume (2003: 107). 
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As argued above, the experience of the war equipped many with violence-based skills 
which they carried with them into the post-war period. Cruz et al. highlight that prison 
inmates who participated in the war are those who tend to be accused of violent crimes 
such as rape and homicide.109 Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the 
reproduction of aggressive maleness and armed violence are not confined to the military, 
nor is it merely a strategy employed during war. Hegemonic forms of masculinities, 
associated with military structures (known as militarised masculinities), can be seen as 
common to social relations in times of both war and peace. The process by which men 
(and women) are socialised inculcates a series of values that award value to traditional 
notions of manliness. For the participants of a self-help group for men in El Salvador, this 
included exaggerated sexual prowess and violence against women. Some men said that 
carrying weapons made them feel more like a man (see Plate 3.1).  
 





On specific holidays such as father's day, the national press is filled with advertisements 
for guns (see Plate 3.2. which addresses this phenomenon). Such gendered discourses 
have been accepted as normal within Salvadoran society. This does not mean that all 
citizens accept and reproduce hegemonic masculinity, but that it is seen as an extreme 
endpoint of the accepted boundaries of male behaviour.111 Key to such discourses is the 
legitimisation of violence in certain circumstances and against certain people. This was 
discussed above with relation to social attitudes towards violence. It is also important to 
emphasise that violence is used with great regularity within familial relations. For many 
young people, violence has been a key element of their socialisation process and 
continues to be used by them, with increasing lethality, as they grow up. The widespread 
availability of SALW in this context contributes to the escalation of lethal crimes. 
 
 
                                                 
109 Cruz et al. (1999). 
110 Hume (2003: 158). 
 
111 See Hume (2004). 
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Youth gangs are predominantly made up of young people (particularly young men) from 
low-income neighbourhoods for whom armed violence has become a way of expressing 
their identity as well being recognised. Many say that they joined the gang for protection 
or for a sense of family that they did not feel within their biological family.113 Young 
women gangmembers must face added victimisation from within the gang, where they 
are faced with added and often highly sexualised violence because of their gender 
identity as women. Sexual violence is used within gangs to "punish" women and some 
must undergo gang rape as their right of passage into the gang. These women are 
belittled, for having "chosen" the "easy" option and the violence goes unrecognised.114 
An added culture of silence surrounds this particular form of violence and women are 
afraid to talk about the violence they face. 115
 
These young men and women grew up in a context impregnated with violence in both 
public and private realms. They have been victims of social, political, economic and 
personal violence.116  In such a situation, young people have learned to survive by 
reproducing violence. With reference to youth violence in Latin America generally, 
Cárdia argues that young people hold a series of beliefs that legitimise the use of violence 
that heighten their vulnerability to violent situations. "These include believing that 
violence is right, that it is a type of retribution that works to repair harm to one's self-
esteem, removing the traces of insults and offences makes one more inclined to respond 
violently when provoked".117  
                                                 
112 Downloaded from: www.violenciaelsalvador.org.sv. Accessed 17 October 2004. 
113 Smutt and Miranda (1998). 
114 Hume (2004: 69). 
115 Interview with member 18 gang (September, 2004). 
116 The categorisation of economic, political and social violence has been developed by Moser (2000), Moser and 
McIlwaine (2000a and b and 2003); Moser and Winton (2002).  See Appendix One for definitions. Personal violence is 
a term used by Galtung (1969). 
117 Cárdia (2001: 176). 
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3.3 Social capital and armed violence 
 
Insecurity and fear that characterised life throughout the years of dictatorship and war 
have not only left their mark on contemporary social relations, but continue to permeate 
the daily lives of citizens. Political violence worked between and within communities to 
disarticulate historic support structures and social networks. Political activity was met 
with state repression, destroying not only material and institutional resources, but 
weakening social capital. Alongside this process, however, many community networks 
emerged and existing groups such as church groups became stronger and more 
articulated.  
 
Thousands of people were displaced as a result of political conflict, many fleeing to 
neighbouring Honduras or to the US.118 It is estimated that around one million people 
were displaced within the region. 119 Many more moved to the national capital, San 
Salvador. The dramatic and unplanned population explosion in the capital put extra 
pressure on already stretched basic services, including housing and domestic water 
supplies. Many of the new arrivals faced difficulty in finding work and did not have 
access to community, familial and social structures in the city. From 1950 – 1992, the 
population of San Salvador increased by 420 per cent.120 Illegal settlements mushroomed 
throughout Greater San Salvador and by 1992/3, almost 27 per cent of the city’s 
population lived in illegal settlements.121 Qualitative research carried out in Greater San 
Salvador indicates that both the presence of intelligence structures (ORDEN) and an 
influx of new residents fostered a climate of mistrust between neighbours. Added to this, 
local level corruption, the politicisation of community structures by both the left and the 
right and existing social conflicts further eroded social capital. Interestingly, one group of 
residents in the district of El Boulevar associated the increase in mistrust and violence 
with the emergence of the youth gang in the community.122 The erosion of historic 
networks during the war, that had up to that point served to suppress violence, allowed 
spaces for new violence to emerge, thus contributing further to the climate of fear and 
insecurity. 
 
Post-war violence in El Salvador has exacerbated existing social cleavages. Fear and 
mistrust work together to undermine social capital in many ways and create a vicious 
circle for the reproduction of violence. The disintegration of social networks further 
reinforces existing fragmentation and public spaces for collective action have reduced. 
Communities' capacity to deal with conflict is limited and violence has become part of 
everyday neighbourhood interaction. For example, squabbles between neighbours often 
result in physical fights and weapons (knives, pistols etc) can be used. Drunken fights are 
                                                 
118 An estimated 1.5 million Salvadorans live in the US. Since the war, migration to the ‘north’ has continued and the 
Salvadoran economy has come to rely heavily on remittances, which are calculated to be about 13.2 per cent of GDP.  
119 Ardón (1998). 
120 This was due to both the industrialisation of San Salvador which attracted large numbers of migrants from rural 
areas who came to the capital in search of work and groups fleeing from political violence in rural areas (see 
Dunkerley, 1993). 
121 Zsachebitz (1999), cited in Savenije and Andrade Eeckhoff (2003: 65). 
122 Hume (2004: 64). 
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aggravated by the use of SALW, as are traffic incidents.  Figures from the PNC, estimate 
that 86 per cent of murders are caused by "social violence", such as family disputes, 
fights between neighbours etc and 14 per cent are down to "criminal violence"123 (see 
Figure 3.1).. 
 











Mobility is severely hampered. According to the PNC, one of the most feared places for 
citizens is on public transport or on the way from home to the bus stop. Savenije and 
Andrade Eekhoff note how both men and women limit their movements and try to change 
their routes to avoid potential danger.125  Participation in local community politics is 
hampered, both because of existing political conflicts within neighbourhoods and the fear 
of leaving the house in the evening. In a community in Soyapango, meetings had to be 
held outside the community because of death threats issued to the community directive 
by neighbours.126 Table 3.4 highlights some of the main responses to criminality. It is 
interesting to note that more respondents acquire firearms (29.4 per cent) than seek to 
organise neighbours in community protection and development initiatives (28.8 per cent).  
 
                                                 
123 PNC registers. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Savenije and Andrade Eekhoff (2003). 
126 Hume (2003: 116). 
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Limit shopping 61.5 
Limit recreation 60.9 
Close Business 19.0 
Live in closed areas 61.2 
Acquire guns 29.4 
Move neighbourhood 41.5 
Organise neighbours  28.8 
 
 
In rural areas, access to basic services is tied up with notions of insecurity. Levels of 
insecurity affect community priorities. For example, one community in the western 
department of Ahuachapan prioritised paving the road, so that the police could enter the 
community and so that residents could run in cases of robbery without falling in the pot-
holes or sliding in the mud.128 In another community in Metapan, women have been 
attacked and sexually assaulted at night when going to fetch water. Farmers and agro-
export businesses are victims of repeated robbery of cattle and crops. Small-scale crime 
has a particularly acute effect on subsistence producers, especially those who are paying 
back loans who are left without sustenance and income. Families are reluctant to leave 
their property unattended which further limits social mobility. Often it is women who 
stay at home to protect the home, thus inhibiting female participation in local 
political/developmental processes.129   
 
 
The existence of youth gangs - perverse social capital - in communities heightens levels 
of insecurity. Residents not only live in constant fear of reprisals from rival gangs – 
which, for example, can result in shoot-outs in the community - but also from the gang 
members themselves. In Soyapango, residents spoke about a "war tax" that the gang has 
enforced on small businesses. Gangs have been responsible for attacking neighbours, 
burglary and muggings. Indeed, some families have had to flee communities for fear of 
gangs. Government initiatives to repress gang members have met with popular support.  
 
4. The political economy of violence 
 
As stated previously, SALW are not legally made in El Salvador. The importation market 
is, therefore, significant. From 1994-2001, 72,107 SALW were legally imported into El 
Salvador. This does not include munitions, nor does it include the numbers of illegal arms 
that are in circulation. As mentioned previously, a series of amnesty laws allowed 
citizens to register SALW without presenting proof of origin: 58.65 per cent of registered 
                                                 
127 Adapted from IUDOP/FUNDAUNGO (2003: 22). 
128 MAM (2000). 
129 Van Acker (2000). 
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SALW are not imported, raising questions about the extent of the illegal firearms 
market.130  
 
Table 4.1: Origins of SALW131
 
Year Number of SALW 
imported by businesses 
Number of 
SALW registered 
% of SALW 
not imported 
1994 994 10921 90.9 
1995 3258 49627 93.44 
1996 9680 22242 59.63 
1997 13180 20807 36.66 
1998 15298 19043 19.67 
1999 13852 18280 24.22 
2000 9991 15405 35.14 
2001 5854 16353 64.2 
Total 72107 172678 58.65 
 
Violence has become an important industry within El Salvador, ranging from petty 
criminality where SALW are increasingly used, to well-articulated criminal gangs 
working throughout the region. Apart from these illegal activities, as mentioned above, 
the growth of private security firms has been notable, reflecting a lack of confidence in 
the state apparatus. The control and regulation of these agencies is lax, particularly with 
reference to their control and possession of arms. According to Godnick, the police in El 
Salvador estimate that on a national level, around 25 per cent of confiscated weapons are 
taken from private security agents. He states that increasingly private security agents are 
implicated in criminal activities including armed assault and arms trafficking.132  
 
 
5. The impact of armed violence on poverty  
 
5.1 Micro level 
 
5.1.1 Household and livelihood levels 
 
Everyday life is shaped by violence. Within the household, levels of violence against 
women and children are high. An estimated 57 per cent of Salvadoran women suffer 
physical violence at the hands of their partners.133 In 2003, 238 women were killed by 
their spouses. No systematic study has been done on violence within the home; however, 
                                                 
130 UNDP (2003: 82). 
131 Adapted from UNDP (2003: 82). 
132 Godnick (2002: 13). 
133 Amaya Cóbar and Palmieri (2000: 75). 
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figures from IUDOP/ACTIVA demonstrate that 80 per cent of adult respondents were 
physically abused as children.134 Further, research done on youth gangs suggests that one 
of the major motivations for young people to join gangs is to seek solidarity and a sense 
of family. Smutt and Miranda identify high levels of violence suffered by gang members 
during childhood.135 In a machista society, women headed households often feel 
threatened without a man present for protection, although data suggest that young men 
are most vulnerable to violence in the public realm.  
 
Residents from marginal communities with a reputation for violence often face 
discrimination when looking for work. There are high levels of school desertion, 
especially among members of gangs, thus affecting livelihood opportunities from an early 
age. Gang members have few (legal) income-generating opportunities. More and more 
jainas (female members) are turning to prostitution (interview with member of 18 gang), 
exposing them to STIs and HIV, as well as increased physical and sexual violence.  
 
Poor communities have less access to public security agents. There is an uneven 
distribution of police officers, with more security agents deployed in higher income 
areas.136 Moreover, given their vulnerability, the poor are more likely to feel the material 
costs of violence, through loss of earnings and/or patrimony. In addition, violence 
adversely affects mobility, as discussed above. Restricted mobility negatively affects 
participation in community activities; it can also restrict access to public services such as 
communal water supplies, public latrines and public transport.  
 
5.2 Macro level 
 
Armed violence has very serious implications for the economy. Figures from 1997 
demonstrate that violence cost El Salvador almost one quarter of its annual GDP, thus 
removing resources from other key areas for public developmental spending, such as 
education and health care.  This figure is higher than Colombia which is currently in the 
midst of war. The effect on service provision is immense. The health service, which is 
already inadequate is further stretched, to deal with injuries and fatalities from armed 
violence. Cruz el al. estimate that a light injury incurs medical costs of about US$343 per 
person. Using an estimate of 78,726 injuries per annum they calculate medical costs 
resulting from armed violence to be about US$27, 003, 018 per annum.137 Few 
rehabilitation centres exist for individuals who have been injured as a result of armed 
violence. In the immediate aftermath of the war, some centres were set up by 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and ex-combatants for those who 
had been maimed by the war to encourage rehabilitation and income-generating 
activities. However; these were already insufficient for the numbers injured by political 
violence.   
 
                                                 
134 IUDOP/ACTIVA (1998). 
135 Smutt and Miranda (1998). 
136 Aguilar, Amaya Cóbar, and Martínez (2001). 
137 Cruz el al. (1998: 19-20). 
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Private investment in security is sizeable. Although no detailed investigation into the 
costs of private security has been undertaken to date, Cruz et al. estimate that the public 
spend around US$7,207,202 per annum. Poorer sections of society are unable to invest in 
private security, given their immediate survival needs. Budgetary investments for public 
security are also sizeable, although some types of crime/armed violence 
detection/prevention are better resourced than others. This was discussed previously with 
reference to kidnapping, which is a crime that affects higher income groups. Furthermore, 
higher incomer groups have better access to public security (justice system and police), as 
noted above.  138 Figures from 1996, highlight that the public security budget was 
US$280 953 780, or 16 per cent of the annual national budget. This includes the police, 
judiciary and prison system, attorney general's office and Human rights ombudsman.139  
 
Table 5.1: Economic costs of social violence in six Latin American 




El Salvador Mexico Peru Venezuela 
Health 
losses 
1.9 5.0 4.3 1.3 1.5 0.3 
Material 
losses 
3.6 8.4 5.1 4.9 2.0 9.0 
Intangible
s 
3.4 6.9 11.5 3.3 1.0 2.2 
Transfers 1.6 4.4 4.0 2.8 0.6 0.3 
Total 10.5 24.7 24.9 12.3 5.1 11.8 
 
6. Overall impact on poverty 
 
Moser has indicated that it is important to distinguish between the structural causes of 
violence and trigger risk factors.141 Research has indicated that violence increases in 
situations of increased economic vulnerability,142 in situations of extreme inequality 143 
and where social and economic exclusion are prevalent.144 The high levels of SALW 
possession increases the lethality of violence and for poor people, losing a family 
member may signify an important loss of income either through death or time off work 
due to injury (as well as having to pay for the costs of burial, hospitals etc.). 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw any direct causal relationship between armed 
violence, SALW and poverty although there are important linkages between them. In 
                                                 
138 Ibid: 25. 
139 Ibid: 25-6. 
140 Londoño (1998), cited in www.violenciaelsalvador.org.sv. Accessed 13 August, 2003. 
141 Moser (2004: 7). 
142 Cruz et al. (1999), citing Fajnzylber (1998). 
143 See, for example, Hojman (2002). 
144 Savenije and Andrade-Eeckhoff (2003). 
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urban areas, cramped and overcrowded housing and limited access to basic services put 
increased pressures on communities. There are few spaces in Salvadoran society that are 
free from violence/threat. It is important to emphasise that poverty does not cause 
violence and not all poor people are violent. In situations where poverty and inequality 
overlap, armed violence is employed as an option by some people.  
 
 Indeed, figures from El Salvador highlight that the poorest departments of the country 
(for example, Morazan and Chalatenago) demonstrate the lowest homicide rates, with the 
highest occurrences in San Salvador, La Libertad and the western regions of Sonsonate 
and Santa Ana (see Table 2.1), where there is a wide gap between rich and poor. This 
points to the necessity of analysing levels of inequality as well as poverty when 
addressing issues of armed violence.   
  
7. Implications for aid programming 
 
International development assistance programmes in El Salvador have been reduced 
significantly in recent years. Immediately following the Peace Accords and natural 
disasters, an influx of development/humanitarian programmes was noted. El Salvador is a 
lower middle income country with a GDP of US$2,147 (in 2001). The UN programmes 
and INGOs, which had a huge presence in the immediate post-war period have been 
downsized considerably with many NGOs leaving the country altogether.  
 
Recent World Bank and Interamerican Development Bank (IDB) policies have targeted 
the issue of violence. Both the World Bank and the IDB are members of an Interagency 
Coalition on Violence Reduction in the Americas along with UNESCO, PAHO, OAS and 
the CDC. The Coalition campaigns to raise awareness of the importance of violence 
prevention and control, as well as supporting research and gathering reliable data on 
violence data and building and disseminating knowledge about effective strategies for 
violence reduction. Several studies have been commissioned, for example: 
 
- Studies on arms funded by the World Bank and the UNDP.145 
- Costs and consequences of violence146. 
- Violence in the Central American region.147 
- Social exclusion and violence.148 
- Youth gangs.149 
Programmes are needed to tackle existing problems of violence, but also to prevent the 
continuity of the problem.  
 
                                                 
145 For example, Cruz and Beltran (2000) and UNDP (2003). 
146 For example: Cruz et al. (1998) funded by IDB. 
147 For example: Moser and Winton (2002) funded by DFID via ODI. 
148 For example: Savenije and Andrade-Eekhoff (2003), funded by SIDA via the UNDP Violence in a Transitional 
Society Programme. 
149Smutt and Miranda (1998) funded by UNDP, IUDOP/Homies Unidos (1998), funded by Radda Barnen; Concha 
Eastman and Santacruz Giralt (2001) funded by PAHO.  
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Investment in strengthening the rule of law by international donors has been significant 
most especially in the immediate post-war era, where institutional support was key. For 
example, the IDB supported judicial reforms, training for the new police force was 
offered by a number of countries including Britain, Ireland, Spain and the US. Continued 
investment in the public security apparatus is necessary both to enhance the effectiveness 
of state bodies and to restore public confidence in the rule of law.  
 
One of the major UNDP initiatives is the Violence in a Transitional Society Programme 
which specifically addresses areas of SALW usage as well as other forms and 
manifestations of violence. Among its activities are: the Angels of Peace campaign to 
educate young children on the dangers of firearms; a prevention programme in the micro-
region of northern San Salvador working with young people; research on different 
expressions of violence; and facilitation of working groups to present reforms to the 
SALW law. Legal reforms and the implementation of stricter gun control is urgent. So 
too are educational programmes on the dangers of SALW. As expressed above, SALW 
are often conceptualised as "instruments of security" and, although some educational 
work has been done, this is an urgent area for future action (See Plates 3.1 and 7.1).  
 
Furthermore, although El Salvador is now characterised as a middle-income country, 
poverty is still a major problem and if the GINI index is used, El Salvador is one of the 
most unequal countries in the world. One of the major problems facing young people, 
particularly young men, is the lack of work opportunities. Programmes to offer vocational 
training, as well as the promotion of cultural and educational activities are necessary to 
provide alternatives for young people.  
 
Planning and infrastructure are also important areas of intervention. In situations of deep 
insecurity, the positioning of and access to public services become key. The location of 
basic services, such as communal water taps and the provision of lighting in public places 




This paper has addressed the problem of armed violence in El Salvador, paying some 
attention to the linkages between armed violence and poverty, emphasising the 
interrelation between the two, but careful not to imply any direct causal relationship. El 
Salvador is a post-war country and it is important not to underestimate the extreme 
repercussions that over a decade of armed political conflict have had on the development 
of society, affecting levels of tolerance and inculcating a certain social respect for 
authoritarian measures. Sustained armed violence has also had a highly negative impact 
on the country’s economic and social development, hampering investment and 
exacerbating the quality of life of its citizens. Violence in the post-war era cannot be 
analysed in isolation from its historical dimensions. This violence, like the more overtly 
political violence of previous decades, does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, structural and 
associated factors combine in the post-war era to shape the current phenomenon. 
Historical factors, such as extreme social and economic inequality and political 
polarisation are exacerbated by weak institutional capacity (especially in the field of 
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public security), and the erosion of social networks as a result of years of political 
conflict. Furthermore, a lack of social and economic alternatives for young people 
contribute to a situation where continued fear and insecurity still mark everyday life for 
many citizens. This situation is further aggravated by the widespread circulation of 
SALW in society, which contributes directly to a rise in lethal violence.  
 








                                                 
150 Downloaded from www.violenciaelsalvador.org.sv 17 October 2004. 
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Appendix 1: categories of armed violence151
 
Category Definition Manifestation 
Political The commission of violent acts 
motivated by a desire, 
conscious or unconscious, to 
obtain or maintain political 
power. 
Guerrilla conflict; paramilitary conflict; 
political assassinations; armed conflict 
between political parties; rape and sexual 
abuse as a political act, forced 
pregnancy/sterilization 
 
Economic The commission of violent acts 
motivated by a desire, 
conscious or unconscious, for 
economic gain or to obtain or 
maintain economic power. 
 
Street crime; carjacking; robbery/theft; drug 
trafficking; kidnapping; assaults, including 
rape occurring during economic crimes. 
Social The commission of violent acts 
motivated by a desire, 
conscious or unconscious, for 
social gain or to obtain or 
maintain social power. 
 
Interpersonal violence such as spouse and 
child abuse; sexual assault of women and 
children; arguments that get out of control. 
 
                                                 
151 Adapted from Moser (2000). 
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Interviews in El Salvador 
 
Name Organisation Date 
 




29 September 2004 
2 Carabillido, Armando UNDP 27 September 2004 
3 Cotto, Augusto PNC 28 September 2004 
4 Cruz, Miguel 
5 Lara, Carlos 
IUDOP 
University of El Salvador 
24 September 2004 
20 September 2004 
6 Linares, Claudia Homies Unidos 21 September 2004 
7 Parada, Aquiles (and other heads 
of division) 
FGR 17 September 2004 
8 Ramirez Mejia, Hugo PNC 18 September 2004 
9 Savenije, Wim  FLACSO 29 September 2004 
 
In addition, I carried out various interviews with members of Mara 18 for my own work, 
one of which I cite in the text, without giving her name.  
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